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Note
It Stands to Reason: An Argument for Article III
Standing Based on the Threat of Future Harm in
Data Breach Litigation
John Biglow*
According to a recent study by the Identity Theft Resource
Center,1 781 data breaches occurred in the United States in
2015.2 Although the size of these breaches differ, the number of
Americans affected is in the hundreds of millions.3 Being the
victim of a data breach typically carries with it the threat of
fraudulent charges or identity theft; however, plaintiffs alleg-
ing these harms have faced a common roadblock in litigation.4
In order for a plaintiff to have standing according to Article III
© 2016 John Biglow
* JD candidate, 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like
to thank Professors Thomas Cotter and William McGeveran for their insight
and feedback, as well as the MJLST editors and staff, specifically James
Meinert and Mickey Stevens. I would also like to thank my friends and family
for all of their encouragement throughout this process, specifically Chloë Car-
dinal for her patience, understanding, and encouragement.
1. The Identity Theft Resource Center is a United States based nonprofit
which focuses on providing free assistance to identity theft victims. See IDEN-
TITY THEFT RES. CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2016).
2. See Identity Theft Resource Center Breach Report its Near Record High
in 2015, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies/2015databreaches.html
[hereinafter Identity Theft].
3. See generally IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS
(2015), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports
_2015.pdf (reporting the details of 2015 data breaches including the number of
people affected). The number of records breached in the healthcare sector
alone numbered over 112 million in 2015. See Dan Munro, Data Breaches in
Healthcare Totaled Over 112 Million Records in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2015,
9:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-
healthcare-total-over-112-million-records-in-2015/#416631f67fd5.
4. See Dana Post, Plaintiffs Alleging Only Future Harm Following a
Data Breach Continue to Face a High Bar, INTL ASSN PRIVACY PROFESSION-
ALS (Jan. 28, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/plaintiffs-alleging-only-future-
harm-following-a-data-breach-continue-to-fa.
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of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must have suf-
fered an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent.5 In recent years, many courts have been unwilling
to grant Article III standing to data breach plaintiffs, ruling for
one reason or another that the harm the plaintiffs claim to
have suffered cannot be shown to be either actual or immi-
nent.6 Federal circuit courts are split on the issue of whether
plaintiffs can satisfy Article IIIs standing requirement while
alleging only future harm or harm based on prophylactic
measures taken to protect against future harm; the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits have allowed standing in these cases while
the Third Circuit has refused standing.7 When the United
States Supreme Court decided Clapper v. Amnesty Internation-
al USA in 2013, a case which concerned the requirements for
Article III standing,8 many posited that Clapper may foreclose
plaintiffs from successfully establishing standing based on fu-
ture harm in data breach cases.9 In 2015, the Seventh Circuit
decided in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC that Clapper
does not foreclose Article III standing based on allegations of
future harm and the taking of prophylactic measures to pre-
5. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).
6. E.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
that allegations of possible future injury stemming from a data breach were
not sufficient to satisfy Article III standing because the threatened injury was
not certainly impending); Amanda Fitzsimmons et al., Seventh Circuit: Vic-
tims of Data Breaches Have Article II Standing to Litigate Class Action Law-
suits, DLA PIPER (July 23, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en
/us/insights/publications/2015/07/seventh-circuit-victims-of-data-breaches/
(To date, an overwhelming majority of courts have dismissed data breach
consumer class actions at the outset due to a lack of cognizable injury-in-fact,
an essential element for standing under Article III of the US Constitution.).
7. Compare Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that the increased future risk of identity theft resulting from a
stolen laptop containing names, addresses and social security numbers of
97,000 employees was sufficient to establish Article III standing), and Pisciot-
ta v. Old Natl Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
increased future risk of harm is sufficient to confer Article III standing), with
Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (holding that allegations of possible future injury stem-
ming from a data breach were not sufficient to satisfy Article III standing be-
cause the threatened injury was not certainly impending).
8. Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
9. Does Clapper Silence Data Breach Litigation? A Two-Year Retrospec-
tive, INFOLAWGROUP (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2015
/02/articles/breach-notice/does-clapper-silence-data-breach-litigation-a-two-
year-retrospective/ (arguing that Clapper has made it highly unlikely for
plaintiffs to establish standing in cases alleging a risk of future harm).
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vent this harm when the harm is imminent; this signaled to the
legal world that the circuit split had survived Clapper.10
This Note will argue that the threat of future harm in data
breach cases, and the prophylactic measures taken to protect
against this future harm, should satisfy the injury-in-fact re-
quirement of Article III and establish standing. Furthermore, it
will argue that ultimately, if the opportunity arises, the United
States Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split
and adopt a ruling similar to that of the Remijas court. Part I
of this Note discusses how state and federal statutes and the
federal circuits have attempted to address the issue of Article
III standing based on allegations of future harm in data breach
cases. Part I begins with a brief introduction on data breaches
and the resulting litigation. Next, Section I.B. discusses Article
IIIs standing requirements and how federal case law has in-
terpreted its requirements in the data breach context. Section
I.C. briefly discusses the potential relevance of Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, a case currently in front of the United States Supreme
Court, to this issue.11 Finally, Sections I.D and I.E. briefly look
at how state and federal statutory law has sought to curtail the
data breach problem by introducing various notification stat-
utes. Part II of this Note will analyze, critique, and compare
the body of law discussed in Part I. Part II begins with an
analysis of the federal case law, including the circuit split, and
the relevance of Clapper and Spokeo, Inc. to this issue. Section
II.C. concludes with a proposal that, depending on how the
Court comes out in the Spokeo, Inc. case, the Court, if the op-
portunity arises, should ultimately resolve the existing circuit
split in favor of a ruling in line with the Remijas courts reason-
ing.
10. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015) (holding that allegations of future harm and mitigation expenses can
establish Article III standing when the harm is imminent and reasoning that
the harm is imminent in data breach cases since the hackers presumably con-
ducted the data breach to make fraudulent charges or assume the identities of
those whose data was breached); Kristin Shepard, Data Breach Class Claims
Survive Clapper, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation
/committees/classactions/articles/summer2015-0915-data-breach-class-claims-
survive-clapper.html.
11. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 1892 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015) (No. 13-1339).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. DATA BREACHES AND THE RESULTING LITIGATION
Most modern companies ask their customers and employ-
ees for their personal information, whether it be financial, like
a credit card number, or identification based, like an address or
a social security number.12 According to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), many of these companies store this infor-
mation either in their files or on their network.13 A data
breach occurs whenever this stored information is accessed by
an unauthorized third party. Since the mid 2000s, data
breaches have become quite common.14 According to Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse, a U.S. based nonprofit which specializes
in consumer privacy rights, advocacy, and education, and has
recorded U.S. data breach records since 2005, there have been
4789 breaches which have been made public since 2005, with
896,258,345 records being compromised.15 This number of rec-
ords seems high until one realizes that many of the larger
breaches involved tens of millions of accounts, with some, nota-
bly the Target Corporation breach of 2013 and the eBay Inc.
breach of 2014, potentially involving over one hundred million
accounts each.16
12. See, e.g., Start with Security: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE
COMMN, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/start-
security-guide-business (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
13. Data Security, FED. TRADE COMMN, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/data-security (last visited Feb. 28,
2016).
14. See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005  Present,
PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-
breach/new [https://perma.cc/4KQL-CRRH].
15. Id.
16. See Lorenzo Ligato, The 9 Biggest Data Breaches of All Time, HUFF-
INGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/biggest-
worst-data-breaches-hacks_us_55d4b5a5e4b07addcb44fd9e (listing the nine
largest U.S. data breaches, measuring from 56 million (The Home Depot, Inc.,
2014), to 160 million (various American businesses, 20052012)); Chris Isi-
dore, Target: Hacking Hit up to 110 Million Customers, CNN MONEY (Jan. 11,
2014, 6:20 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/10/news/companies/target-
hacking/ (reporting that the Target Corporation breach affected as many as 40
million customers credit or debit card information and as many as 70 million
customers personal information, such as their name, address, phone number
and email[s] were hacked); Andrea Peterson, eBay Asks 145 Million Users to
Change Passwords After Data Breach, WASH. POST (May 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/05/21/ebay-asks-
145-million-users-to-change-passwords-after-data-breach/ (reporting that the
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When a company suffers a data security breach in which
their customers or employees personal information is stolen or
accessed, legal claims by the affected customers or employees
often follow.17 Allegations commonly claim either a breach of a
legal duty by the company due to lax security or that the plain-
tiffs have suffered some sort of recoverable injury;18 this Note
concerns the latter group of claims. Data breach cases in which
plaintiffs claim to have suffered a recoverable injury are com-
monly divided into two categories.19 In the first category are
individuals whose information has been stolen and utilized by
the thief for financial gain.20 These individuals face the least
amount of roadblocks in litigation,21 and due to this, this cate-
gory will not be discussed in this Note. The second category in-
cludes individuals whose information has been stolen or ac-
cessed in a data breach but who have not yet suffered any
financial loss stemming from the unauthorized use of their in-
formation.22 These individuals allege to have suffered an injury
eBay breach occurred between late February and early March of 2014, that
the hackers gained access to encrypted passwords and other personal infor-
mation, including names, e-mail addresses, physical addresses, phone num-
bers and dates of birth, and that although eBay did not report how many of
its accounts had been breached, it nonetheless asked all 145 million of its us-
ers to change their passwords as a precautionary measure).
17. See Douglas H. Meal & David T. Cohen, Private Data Security Breach
Litigation in the United States, in PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE LEGAL ISSUES
101, 102 (2014) (Although data security breaches are now commonplace,
those breaches where personal information is stolen or put at risk of being
stolen often trigger legal claims by private plaintiffs seeking to characterize
the breach as the result of unreasonable, lax measures by the breached com-
pany in protecting the personal information in question . . . . [S]uch plaintiffs
frequently struggle to plead and prove that the data security breach resulted
from the victims breach of its legal obligations, as opposed to an unfortunate
perpetration of computer crime by third parties, and/or that any breach of
legal obligations caused any recoverable injury. (footnote omitted)).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at
the Current State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 39899, 404
(2014) (listing two classes of cases after a data breach has occurred; Class I
cases in which the plaintiff has suffered a financial loss stemming from a data
breach and Class II cases in which the plaintiff has taken steps to prevent
future harm stemming from a data breach or they have alleged that future
harm is imminent due to a data breach).
20. In the first class of cases, the plaintiffs personal or financial infor-
mation has been stolen by a third party, and that third party has used that
information to make purchases using the plaintiffs money. See id. at 39899.
21. See id. at 399; Post, supra note 4.
22. See Cease, supra note 19, at 399 (The second class of casesClass II
Casesare those in which the plaintiffs information has been accessed but
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based upon the threat that they may suffer a loss in the future,
or that they have suffered an injury in taking steps to protect
themselves from this future loss; it is common for plaintiffs to
allege both.23 Plaintiffs that find themselves in this second cat-
egory face significant challenges in litigation.24 This second
category of cases will form the main scope of this Note.
B. ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIREMENT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION IN FEDERAL DATA BREACH CASES
In order for a federal court to have the jurisdiction to hear
a case, it must satisfy Article IIIs cases or controversies re-
quirement.25 Part of this requirement is that plaintiffs must
establish that they have standing to sue, at the pleading
stage.26 In order to have standing, a plaintiff must have an in-
jury-in-fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest
that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or immi-
nent, not conjectural or hypothetical.27 In order for a pending
future injury to be imminent, it must be certainly impend-
ing.28 The United States Supreme Court has not uniformly
required a showing that a future injury is literally certain,
and has allowed standing in some cases where there is a sub-
stantial risk that the harm will occur, which may prompt
plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that
that information has not been used to open bank accounts, make unauthorized
purchases, or otherwise harm the plaintiffs. However, these plaintiffs typically
claim that they have been harmed in other ways: incurring costs for credit-
monitoring services, paying the costs of cancelling and receiving new bank
cards, suffering loss of reward points from cancelled cards, and enduring gen-
eral anxiety that their information will be used in the future to make unau-
thorized purchases.).
23. See id. In this Note these types of alleged injuries will be classified as
the threat of future harm, and the prophylactic measures taken to protect
against this future harm.
24. See generally Post, supra note 4 (discussing outcomes in cases filed
over future harms from a data breach).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41
(3d Cir. 2011) (Article III limits our jurisdiction to actual cases or controver-
sies.).
26. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 41 (One element of this bedrock requirement is
that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue. (quoting
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997))).
27. Id. at 4142 (quoting Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d
286, 29091 (3d Cir. 2005)).
28. Id. at 42 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
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harm.29 Circuit courts have split over the issue of whether the
threat of future harm stemming from a data breach and the
prophylactic measures taken to protect against this future
harm satisfy this Article III standing requirement.30
1. Pisciotta, Krottner, and Reilly; the Circuit Split Begins
When the Seventh Circuit decided Pisciotta v. Old Nation-
al Bancorp in 2007, it became the first of the circuit courts to
address the issue of Article III standing for allegations of fu-
ture harm and the prophylactic measures taken to protect
against this harm in the data breach context.31 The plaintiffs in
the case were Luciano Pisciotta and Daniel Mills, who brought
the action on behalf of a class of individuals who had provided
information to Old National Bancorp (ONB) either as custom-
ers or potential customers.32 ONB had suffered a security
breach in which these class members personal and financial
information had been accessed.33 Significantly to the issue of
standing, the plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint any
completed direct financial loss to their accounts as a result of
the breach, but instead alleged they had incurred expenses in
order to prevent their confidential personal information from
being used and will continue to incur expenses in the future.34
The court decided in favor of conferring Article III standing,
reasoning that, the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied
by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plain-
tiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff
would have otherwise faced, absent the defendants actions.35
29. Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013) (citing
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 15355 (2010)).
30. Compare Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that the increased future risk of identity theft resulting from a
stolen laptop containing names, addresses and social security numbers of
97,000 employees was sufficient to establish Article III standing), and Pisciot-
ta v. Old Natl Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
increased future risk of harm is sufficient to confer Article III standing), with
Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (holding that allegations of possible future injury stem-
ming from a data breach were not sufficient to satisfy Article III standing be-
cause the threatened injury was not certainly impending).
31. See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634.
32. Id. at 63132.
33. Id. at 632.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 634.
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The Pisciotta court supported its reasoning by stating that
it was in line with many of [their] sister circuits.36 In a foot-
note, the court cited four cases as persuasive precedent: Denney
v. Deutsche Bank AG, Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.,
Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, and Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.37 Though the Pis-
ciotta court considered these future harm cases to be persua-
sive and instructive, they provided little analysis for why these
fact patterns are analogous or why the analogies are apt. In
Denney, the plaintiffs alleged fraudulent and improper tax
counseling.38 The Pisciotta court cited dicta from Denney in
which they discuss how, exposure to toxic or harmful sub-
stances . . . [can] satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact require-
ment even without physical symptoms of injury caused by the
exposure.39 In Sutton, the court held that Article III standing
was present based on the increased risk of future harm stem-
ming from a defective medical device.40 In Central Delta, the
court conferred standing to a group of farmers who claimed a
risk of future harm to their crops if the United States Bureau
of Reclamations plans increased the salinity of available irri-
gation water.41 In Friends of the Earth, the court found stand-
36. Id. at 634.
37. Id. 634 n.3; Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 26465 (2d
Cir. 2006) (discussing, in dicta, injury based on exposure to toxic substances);
Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 57475 (6th Cir. 2005) (con-
cerning defective medical devices); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States,
306 F.3d 938, 94748 (9th Cir. 2002) (concerning environmental harm);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160
(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (concerning environmental harm).
38. See Denney, 443 F.3d at 253.
39. Id. at 26465 (For example, exposure to toxic or harmful substances
has been held sufficient to satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact requirement
even without physical symptoms of injury caused by the exposure, and even
though exposure alone may not provide sufficient ground for a claim under
state tort law.).
40. See Sutton, 419 F.3d at 57475 (Sutton has alleged sufficient facts,
when accepted as true, to suggest an increased risk of future harm resulting
from being implanted with St. Judes device. Whether Sutton is likely to pre-
vail on the merits is not a proper consideration at this time. We decline to
preclude the possibility of a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs bringing suit under
an increased risk of future harm theory due to the implantation of a medical
device.).
41. See Cent. Delta Water Agency, 306 F.3d at 94748 (Because they use
the water to irrigate their crops, plaintiffs contend that their ability to grow
those crops will be severely hampered by the excessively saline water. The
injury alleged has not yet occurred; it is threatened . . . . [W]e conclude that
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ing where the defendants violation of a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System permit caused pollution of a water-
way, which increased the risk of future harm to those down-
stream who used the waterway.42 The Pisciotta court did not
discuss why these cases provided support, but instead took it as
self-evident that data breaches were analogous to these fact
patterns and that therefore their reasoning could be utilized as
support.43
The next circuit court to address the issue was the Ninth
Circuit in 2010 with its decision in Krottner v. Starbucks
Corp.44 The plaintiffs in this case were some 97,000 current or
former Starbucks employees whose names, addresses, and so-
cial security numbers were stored on a laptop that was stolen
from Starbucks.45 The court in this case, citing Pisciotta,
among other cases, found that the plaintiffs allegations of fu-
ture harm stemming from the theft of the laptop were sufficient
to satisfy Article IIIs injury-in-fact requirement and confer
standing.46 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had alleged
a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from
the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal da-
ta, and stated that had the allegations [been] more conjectur-
al or hypotheticalfor example, if no laptop had been stolen,
and Plaintiffs had sued based on the risk that it would be sto-
len at some point in the futurewe would find the threat far
the necessary showing for standing purposes is not that the Vernalis standard
has already been exceeded, or that plaintiffs crops have already been dam-
aged by excessively saline water, but that plaintiffs face significant risk that
the crops that they have planted will not survive as a result of the Bureaus
decisions to discharge water from the New Melones Reservoir during April,
May, and October, rather than when needed to meet the Vernalis standard.
The threat of injury resulting from the Bureaus employing an operational
plan that will likely lead to violations of the Vernalis standard is sufficient to
confer standing on plaintiffs.).
42. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 160 (In this case, Gaston
Coppers alleged permit violations threaten the waters within the acknowl-
edged range of its discharge, including the lake on Shealys property. By pro-
ducing evidence that Gaston Copper is polluting Shealys nearby water source,
CLEAN has shown an increased risk to its members downstream uses. This
threatened injury is sufficient to provide injury in fact.).
43. See Pisciotta v. Old Natl Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
44. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
45. Id. at 1140.
46. Id. at 114243 (On these facts, however, PlaintiffsAppellants have
sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing.).
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less credible.47 In support of its reasoning, this court utilized
the Pisciotta review of analogous precedent in toxic substances,
medical monitoring, and environmental harm cases.48
The Third Circuit, when faced with an identical Article III
standing issue and a similar set of facts to those in Pisciotta
and Krottner, came to the opposite conclusion when it decided
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. in 2011.49 The plaintiffs in Reilly were
a group of employees of the Brach Eichler law firm, which was
a customer of Ceridian Corporation, a payroll-processing firm.50
In December of 2009, Ceridian Corporations data security was
breached, allowing access to personal and financial infor-
mation belonging to . . . approximately 27,000 employees at
1,900 companies.51 Included in the information accessed were
the individuals first name, last name, social security number
and, in several cases, birth date and/or the bank account that is
used for direct deposit.52 The injuries that the plaintiffs al-
leged to have incurred included, an increased risk of identity
theft, . . . costs to monitor their credit activity,
and . . . emotional distress.53 Like the plaintiffs in Pisciotta
and Krottner, the plaintiffs did not allege any existing harm,
only future harm and costs stemming from prophylactic pre-
ventative measures.54 The Reilly court refused to confer Article
III standing, reasoning that the allegations of future injury
were hypothetical, and attenuated, because [they are] de-
pendent on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown
47. Id. at 1143.
48. Id. at 1142 (The [Pisciotta] court surveyed case law addressing toxic
substance, medical monitoring, and environmental claims in the Second,
Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. It concluded: As many of our sister circuits
have noted, the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of fu-
ture harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of
future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defend-
ants actions. We concur in this view. Once the plaintiffs allegations establish
at least this level of injury, the fact that the plaintiffs anticipate that some
greater potential harm might follow the defendants act does not affect the
standing inquiry. (citations omitted)).
49. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 4142 (3d Cir. 2011).




54. Id. at 43 ([A]ppellants in this case have yet to suffer any harm, and
their alleged increased risk of future injury is nothing more than specula-
tion.).
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third-party.55 Among this speculation, reasoned the court, was
that the hacker read, copied, and understood their personal
information; . . . intends to commit future criminal acts by mis-
using the information; and . . . is able to use such information
to the detriment of Appellants by making unauthorized trans-
actions in Appellants names.56 The Reilly court distinguished
the case in front of them from Pisciotta and Krottner, arguing
that, the threatened harms [in Pisciotta and Krottner] were
significantly more imminent and certainly impending than
the alleged harm here.57 Furthermore, the Reilly court criti-
cized the reasoning of the Pisciotta and Krottner courts for re-
fusing to get to the bottom of the constitutional standing issue,
stating that, both courts simply analogized data-security-
breach situations to defective-medical-device, toxic-substance-
exposure, or environmental injury cases.58
55. Id. at 42 (We conclude that Appellants allegations of hypothetical,
future injury are insufficient to establish standing. Appellants contentions
rely on speculation that the hacker: (1) read, copied, and understood their
personal information; (2) intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing
the information; and (3) is able to use such information to the detriment of
Appellants by making unauthorized transactions in Appellants names. Unless
and until these conjectures come true, Appellants have not suffered any inju-
ry; there has been no misuse of the information, and thus, no harm.).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 44 (In Pisciotta, there was evidence that the [hackers] intru-
sion was sophisticated, intentional and malicious. In Krottner, someone at-
tempted to open a bank account with a plaintiffs information following the
physical theft of the laptop. Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was
intentional or malicious. Appellants have alleged no misuse, and therefore, no
injury. Indeed, no identifiable taking occurred; all that is known is that a
firewall was penetrated. Appellants string of hypothetical injuries do not meet
the requirement of an actual or imminent injury. (alteration in original) (ci-
tations omitted)).
58. Id. at 4445 (First, in those cases, an injury has undoubtedly oc-
curred. In medical-device cases, a defective device has been implanted into the
human body with a quantifiable risk of failure. Similarly, exposure to a toxic
substance causes injury; cells are damaged and a disease mechanism has been
introduced . . . . Second, standing in medical-device and toxic-tort cases hinges
on human health concerns. Courts resist strictly applying the actual injury
test when the future harm involves human suffering or premature death.
(citations omitted)).
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2. Clapper Holds That Future Harm Must be Certainly
Impending to Satisfy Article IIIs Standing Requirement;
Potentially Forecloses Data Breach Plaintiffs from Gaining
Standing by Alleging Future Harm
In 2013, the United States Supreme Court decided Clap-
per; a case in which the issue of Article III standing based upon
future harm was discussed in great detail.59 The plaintiffs in
this case were a group of U.S. citizens whose work put them in
international communications with individuals who they be-
lieve[d] [were] likely targets of surveillance under § 1881a.60
Section 1881a is a part of U.S. intelligence law61 that allows
the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authoriz-
ing the surveillance of individuals who are not United States
persons and are reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States.62 The plaintiffs argued that they could demon-
strate the injury-in-fact necessary to establish Article III stand-
ing, because there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that
their communications will be acquired under § 1881a at some
point in the future.63 The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
Article III standing, because they cannot demonstrate that the
future injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending and
because they cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs
in anticipation of non-imminent harm.64 In articulating the
standard for Article III standing, the Court stated that, we
have repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be cer-
tainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and that
[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.65 This
language seemed to forestall allegations of future injury from
satisfying Article III standing; indeed, many posited that Clap-
per could be the end of data breach litigation based on the
59. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 114655 (2013).
60. Id. at 1142.
61. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a
(2012).
62. Id. at 1142 (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 1143.
64. Id. at 1155.
65. Id. at 1147 (alteration in original) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
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threat of future injury and the prophylactic measures taken to
prevent it.66
3. Remijas: the Circuit Split Survives Clapper
In the wake of Clapper, it seemed unclear whether data
breach cases in which plaintiffs lack actual misuse of data
would be able to survive a Clapper challenge to standing.67
When the Seventh Circuit decided Remijas in July of 2015,68
and Neiman Marcus Group, LLCs petition for a rehearing en
banc was subsequently denied, it became clear to the legal
world that data breach plaintiffs lacking a showing of actual
data misuse could indeed satisfy the Clapper standing re-
quirements and that the circuit split remained.69 The plaintiffs
in Remijas were a group of Neiman Marcus customers whose
credit card numbers had potentially been exposed during a
2013 data security breach.70 Among the issues that the Remijas
court faced was whether to confer standing to the class mem-
bers who were alleging that un-reimbursed fraudulent charges
and identity theft may happen in the future, and that these
injuries are likely enough that immediate preventative
measures are necessary.71 In conferring standing to these
plaintiffs, the Remijas court argued that Clapper does
not . . . foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries to sup-
66. See Does Clapper Silence Data Breach Litigation? A Two-Year Retro-
spective, supra note 9 (discussing the possibility that Clapper could silence
data breach litigation).
67. See Heidi J. Milicic, Standing to Bring Data Breach Class Actions
Post-Clapper, A.B.A. (Aug. 7, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation
/committees/commercial/articles/summer2014-0814-data-breach-class-actions-
post-clapper.html (Several defendants have seized upon the Supreme Courts
decision in Clapper to challenge standing in data breach cases where the
plaintiffs have not alleged actual misuse of the data. To date, virtually every
defendant asserting a Clapper-based challenge has been successful. Federal
courts in Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, and the District of Columbia have inter-
preted Clapper to require dismissal of data breach lawsuits where the plain-
tiffs have not alleged actual misuse of the data. One California district court,
however, found that standing existed even though the plaintiffs did not allege
actual misuse of their data. (citation omitted)).
68. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
69. See Shepard, supra note 10.
70. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690 (In mid-December 2013, Neiman Marcus
learned that fraudulent charges had shown up on the credit cards of some of
its customers . . . . 350,000 cards were potentially exposed; and 9,200 of those
350,000 cards were known to have been used fraudulently.).
71. Id. at 692.
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port Article III standing.72 In defense of this, the court cited a
footnote from Clapper that stated that a substantial risk of
harm can sometimes suffice to confer standing.73 In reasoning
that the plaintiffs risk of harm from the data breach was sub-
stantial, the court made the following argument: Why else
would hackers break into a stores database and steal consum-
ers private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack
is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those
consumers identities.74 The court found that in this case, as
opposed to in Clapper, [t]he hackers deliberately targeted
Neiman Marcus in order to obtain their credit-card infor-
mation, and that there was no speculation about whether the
information was stolen and what was taken.75 The court also
cited as support a United States Government Accountability
Office report which found that stolen data may be held for up
to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft
[and] once stolen . . . fraudulent use of that information may
continue for years.76 In deciding that the plaintiffs should also
be conferred standing for time and money lost to mitigation of
future harm, the court reasoned that since there is a substan-
tial risk that the harm will occur, this makes the harm immi-
nent and therefore the mitigation expenses qualify as actual
injuries.77 In so reasoning, the court found it highly probative
72. Id. at 693.
73. Id. (To the contrary, it stated that [o]ur cases do not uniformly re-
quire plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain that the harms they
identify will come about. In some instances, we have found standing based on
a substantial risk that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to
reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm. (alteration in original)
(quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013))).
74. Id.
75. Id. (The plaintiffs allege that the hackers deliberately targeted
Neiman Marcus in order to obtain their credit-card information. Whereas in
Clapper, there was no evidence that any of respondents communications ei-
ther had been or would be monitored, in our case there is no need to speculate
as to whether [the Neiman Marcus customers] information has been stolen
and what information was taken. (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148)).
76. Id. at 694 (quoting U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-
737, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: PERSONAL INFORMATION 29
(2007)).
77. Id. (Mitigation expenses do not qualify as actual injuries where the
harm is not imminent. Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by incurring
costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm. If the law were otherwise, an
enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower standard for Article III
standing simply by making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear. Once
2016] IT STANDS TO REASON 957
that Neiman Marcus had offered free credit monitoring and
identity theft protection to all of its customers who had
shopped at the store during the time that the data breach was
occurring.78
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPOKEO, INC. TO ARTICLE III STANDING
IN DATA BREACH CASES
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins is a case currently in front of the
United States Supreme Court, which could have huge implica-
tions on the issue of Article III standing in data breach cases.79
Spokeo, Inc. was granted certiorari out of the Ninth Circuit to
resolve the issue of whether the plaintiff can maintain Article
III jurisdiction based solely on the violation of a federal statute
by Spokeo, Inc.that is, without suffering any concrete harm.80
Robins, the plaintiff and respondent in this case, is alleging
that Spokeo, Inc., a website that sells reports of aggregated,
publicly available information about individuals,81 had com-
piled a report associated with his name which was available for
purchase and contained inaccurate information about him, in
contravention of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15
again, however, it is important not to overread Clapper. Clapper was address-
ing speculative harm based on something that may not even have happened to
some or all of the plaintiffs. In our case, Neiman Marcus does not contest the
fact that the initial breach took place. An affected customer, having been noti-
fied by Neiman Marcus that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to
subscribe to a service that offers monthly credit monitoring. (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Clapper 133 S. Ct. at 115152)).
78. Id. (It is telling in this connection that Neiman Marcus offered one
year of credit monitoring and identity-theft protection to all customers for
whom it had contact information and who had shopped at their stores between
January 2013 and January 2014. It is unlikely that it did so because the risk
is so ephemeral that it can safely be disregarded. These credit-monitoring
services come at a price that is more than de minimis . . . . That easily quali-
fies as a concrete injury.).
79. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135
S. Ct. 1892 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015) (No. 13-1339).
80. See Michelle W. Cohen & J. Taylor Kirklin, Whats at Stake in the
Supreme Courts Decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins?, DATA SEC. L. BLOG (Sept.
21, 2015), http://datasecuritylaw.com/blog/whats-at-stake-in-the-supreme-
courts-decision-in-spokeo-inc-v-robins/ (Spokeo, Inc. v. Robinswhich in-
volves the question of whether Congress, by authorizing a private right of ac-
tion based on a violation of a federal statute, can confer Article III standing
upon a plaintiff who has suffered no concrete harmis one of the most eagerly
anticipated decisions from the Supreme Courts October 2015 term.).
81. Id.
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U.S.C. § 1681.82 Robins suit was originally dismissed without
prejudice for failure to establish standing;83 this ruling was lat-
er reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit before the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.84 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that Congress intends to create a statutory
right when it creates statutes with a private right of action,
and that because Robins suffered an individualized harm from
FCRAs violation, due to his personal interests in the handling
of his credit information,85 the violation of this statutory right
was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Arti-
cle III.86 If the United States Supreme Court were to uphold
the Ninth Circuits ruling on the issue and allow Article III
standing based on the violation of a federal statute, plaintiffs in
data breach litigation would simply need to show a violation of
a federal statute which has a private right of action in order to
gain standing.87
82. Id. (Specifically, he claimed that Spokeos report stated that Robins
had a graduate degree (when he does not), that he was employed and wealthy
(when he actually was unemployed), and that Robins was married with chil-
dren (both inaccurate).); see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 16811681x (2012) (estab-
lishing requirements on credit reporting agencies).
83. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV1005306, 2011 WL 11562151, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011) ([T]he Court reinstates the January 27, 2011 Order,
which found that Plaintiff fails to establish standing. Among other things, the
alleged harm to Plaintiffs employment prospects is speculative, attenuated
and implausible. Mere violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not con-
fer Article III standing, moreover, where no injury in fact is properly pled.
Otherwise, federal courts will be inundated by web surfers endless com-
plaints. Plaintiff also fails to allege facts sufficient to trace his alleged harm to
Spokeos alleged violations. In short, Plaintiff fails to establish his standing
before this Court. (citations omitted)).
84. See Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d at 41314.
85. Id. at 413.
86. Id. at 41214 (First, Congresss creation of a private cause of action
to enforce a statutory provision implies that Congress intended the enforcea-
ble provision to create a statutory right. Second, the violation of a statutory
right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing . . . . The scope of
the cause of action determines the scope of the implied statutory right. When,
as here, the statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages,
a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual
damages . . . . Robinss personal interests in the handling of his credit infor-
mation are individualized rather than collective. Therefore, alleged violations
of Robinss statutory rights are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact require-
ment of Article III. (citations omitted)).
87. Forty-seven states . . . have enacted legislation requiring private,
governmental or educational entities to notify individuals of security breaches
of information involving personally identifiable information, and with the
proposal of the Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015 before Con-
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D. STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTORY DATA BREACH LAW AND FTC
REGULATION
With the burgeoning number of data breaches that have
occurred in the United States, state and federal legislators
have taken steps to solve the issue.88 Although these statutes
establish security measures, their main thrust is notification.89
Most of these statutes do not establish a private right of action
gress, a federal notification statute could potentially follow. See Security
Breach Notification Laws, NATL CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx; but see Grant Gross, Pro-
posed Data Breach Notification Bill Criticized as Too Weak, CSO (Mar. 18,
2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2898809/data-
breach/proposed-data-breach-notification-bill-criticized-as-too-weak.html.
88. See Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 87 (Forty-
seven states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Is-
lands have enacted legislation requiring private, governmental or educational
entities to notify individuals of security breaches of information involving per-
sonally identifiable information.); Jeff Kosseff, Analysis of White House Data
Breach Notification Bill, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.insideprivacy.com/uncategorized/analysis-of-white-house-data-
breach-notification-bill/ (On Monday, President Obama announced his pro-
posal of the Personal Data Notification & Protection Act, which would set na-
tionwide rules for data breach notifications and preempt the patchwork of
state breach notification laws.).
89. See MINN. STAT. § 325E.61, subd. 1 (2014) (Any person or business
that . . . owns or licenses data that includes personal information, shall dis-
close any breach of the security of the system . . . to any resident of this state
whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. This disclosure must be made
in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay . . . .);
MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subd. 2 (2014) (No person or entity . . . that accepts
an access device in connection with a transaction shall retain the card security
code data, the PIN verification code number, or the full contents of any track
of magnetic stripe data . . . . A person or entity is in violation of this section if
its service provider retains such data subsequent to the authorization of the
transaction or in the case of a PIN debit transaction, subsequent to 48 hours
after authorization of the transaction.); see also Hogan Lovells, Data Security
and Breach Notification Legislation Gaining Traction in Congress, INTL ASSN
PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (Mar. 30, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/data-
security-and-breach-notification-legislation-gaining-traction-in-congress/ (The
[Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015] requires covered entities
to implement and maintain reasonable security measures to protect personal
information and establishes breach notification obligations for covered entities
that suffer a data security breach.). But see Grant Gross, Proposed Data
Breach Notification Bill Criticized as Too Weak, CSO (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:57
PM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2898809/data-breach/proposed-data-
breach-notification-bill-criticized-as-too-weak.html (criticizing the current
federal bill for being weaker than many existing state laws and also for
preempting those existing state laws).
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for victims whose statutory rights have been violated, though
some do.90 It is possible that the Court will decide in Spokeo,
Inc. to confer standing whenever a statute containing a private
right of action is violated; therefore, those federal data breach
statutes containing private rights of action may soon be utilized
to confer Article III standing in data breach litigation cases.
The FTC has the authority to regulate cyber security is-
sues via the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive
business practices.91 The FTC has brought actions against
many companies in response to actual or potential breaches of
data security.92 The FTC has a wide latitude of injunctive and
equitable relief it can seek, including consumer redress and the
issuance of fines for violations of settlement orders stemming
from an action. The FTC cannot issue civil penalties pursuant
to violations of this Act.93 Significantly for plaintiffs, there is no
citizen suit provision, which means that an affected consumer
90. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(10) (West Supp. 2016) (This section
does not establish a private right of action.). But see CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.84(b) (West 2009) (Any customer injured by a violation of this title may
institute a civil action to recover damages.). See generally STEPTOE & JOHN-
SON LLP, COMPARISON OF US STATE AND FEDERAL SECURITY BREACH NOTIFI-
CATION LAWS (2016), http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments
/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart.pdf (providing a table with excerpts of
state and federal data security statutes, including whether they offer a private
right of action).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) (making unlawful and authorizing the
FTC to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce); id. § 45 (n) (requiring the FTC to only declare practices unlawful if
the practices cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers and
the consumers cannot reasonably avoid[] the injury themselves); see also
Fed. Trade Commn v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 24649 (3d
Cir. 2015) (affirming the FTCs authority to regulate a companys data securi-
ty practices to ensure that they are reasonable and appropriate to protect con-
sumers data, and that the FTC can take action before actual injury occurs).
92. See generally Cases Tagged with Data Security, FED. TRADE COMMN,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/terms/249 (last visited Feb.
20, 2016) (listing FTC data security enforcement cases).
93. See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43723, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSIONS REGULATION OF DATA SECURITY UNDER ITS UNFAIR OR
DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES (UDAP) AUTHORITY 57 (2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43723.pdf (The FTC Act authorizes the
FTC to seek injunctive and other equitable relief, including consumer redress,
for violations. The FTC does not possess explicit authority to issue civil penal-
ties for data security violations of the FTC Act and is limited to fining compa-
nies for violating a settlement order. Fines issued by the FTC must reflect the
amount of consumer loss. If the respondent elects to settle the charges, it may
sign a consent agreement (without admitting liability), consent to entry of a
final order, and waive all right to judicial review. (emphasis added)).
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would be out of luck unless the FTC decides to take an action.
Since there have only been around sixty data breach actions
taken by the FTC since 2000,94 FTC action is not a common av-
enue of compensation for most data breach victims.
E. PROBLEMS RELATING TO DAMAGES AND CAUSATION STILL
REMAIN FOR DATA BREACH PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs successfully alleging injuries sufficient for stand-
ing in data breach cases will still need to tackle problems relat-
ing to damages and causation. It is common for companies who
have suffered a data breach to offer some sort of free credit
monitoring to those individuals affected by the breach.95 Fur-
thermore, it is typical for banks and credit card companies to
absorb the financial harm stemming from fraudulent charges.96
With no out-of-pocket costs, plaintiffs will need to show how
exactly they have suffered legitimate damages. There are many
different theories of damages that have been put forward in
data breach cases with little success to date.97 Furthermore,
when many breaches happen simultaneously, plaintiffs with
multiple accounts breached at different companies may face a
problem of proving that any one particular breach is the cause
of their harm. Even though these problems are important in
determining a plaintiffs ability to receive compensation from a
data breach, they lie outside the scope of this Note.
94. See Cases Tagged with Data Security, FED. TRADE COMMN,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/terms/249 (last visited Feb.
20, 2016).
95. See Jeff John Roberts, 5 Ways a Firm Can Stop a Data Breach Law-
suit, FORTUNE (Feb. 2, 2016, 9:08 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/02/data-
breach-lawsuits/ (Today, in the wake of a data breach, most retailers are
quick to offer free access to services that monitor for credit and identity
theft.).
96. See Consumer Fraud, DEBT.ORG, https://www.debt.org/credit/your-
consumer-rights/fraud/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (Banks and card compa-
nies absorb most of the financial responsibilities for the fraud.).
97. See Paul G. Karlsgodt, Key Issues in Consumer Data Breach Litiga-
tion, PRACTICAL L.J., Oct.Nov. 2014, at 49, 5354,
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/News/Articles
/LITIGATION/2014/Karlsgodt-Lit_OctNov14_DataBreachFeature.pdf (dis-
cussing alternative theories of harm that have been tried for establishing
standing and damages, including [l]ost time and inconvenience, [e]motional
distress, the [d]ecreased economic value of [personally identifiable infor-
mation], and being [d]enied the benefit of the bargain).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. ANALYZING THE FEDERAL CASE LAW: PISCIOTTA, KROTTNER,
REILLY, ANDREMIJAS
1. Pisciotta and Krottner Get the Answer Right but Utilize
Faulty Reasoning
The courts in Pisciotta and Krottner each held that the fu-
ture risk of harm was sufficient to confer Article III standing.98
The Pisciotta court cites the reasoning of four circuit court cas-
es involving future harm fact patterns in support of its conten-
tion that the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a
threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff
only by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff
would have otherwise faced, absent the defendants actions.99
Although not explicitly expounded by the court, one can infer
that these cases are provided as persuasive precedent because
the court finds the future harm fact patterns which form their
subject matter to be analogous to the threat of future harm
from the data breach at issue in Pisciotta. The issues discussed
in these four cases include exposure to toxic substances (Den-
ney), defective medical equipment (Sutton), potential crop loss
(Central Delta), and environmental contamination (Friends of
the Earth).100 The Krottner court goes perhaps a step further
than the Pisciotta court in its explanation of the analogy by ex-
plaining the reasoning utilized in these cases, before noting
that the Pisciotta court had found the analogy to the data
98. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the increased future risk of identity theft resulting from a stolen
laptop containing names, addresses and social security numbers of 97,000
employees was sufficient to establish Article III standing); Pisciotta v. Old
Natl Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an increased
future risk of harm is sufficient to confer Article III standing).
99. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 & n.3 (citing the reasoning in Denney v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 26465 (2d Cir. 2006)); Sutton v. St. Jude
Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 57075 (6th Cir. 2005); Cent. Delta Water Agen-
cy v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 94748 (9th Cir. 2002); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir.
2000)).
100. Denney, 443 F.3d at 26465; Sutton, 419 F.3d at 57475; Cent. Delta
Water Agency, 306 F.3d at 94748; Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 160.
For additional discussion on the use of these cases in Pisciotta, see supra notes
3643, 58 and accompanying text.
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breach context compelling, and then ultimately agreeing with
the Pisciotta court.101
Legal scholars differ on the value and usefulness of reason-
ing by analogy.102 It seems clear, however, that regardless of
how important or useful of a tool reasoning by analogy may be
to legal reasoning in general, it is possible to misuse it. In fact,
it is the very aspect which draws us towards the use of analogy
in legal reasoning that should give us pause. Analogies are val-
ued for their ability to draw out similarities between two relat-
ed concepts; however, by highlighting the similarities, analo-
gies tend to mask the differences. Furthermore, analogies are
sometimes used to bolster what is in effect a weak argument.
The flaws of reasoning by analogy are exacerbated if the
analogy is not thoroughly expounded, and as the Reilly court
points out, the Pisciotta and Krottner courts applied minimal
scrutiny to their analogy of data breaches to other future harm
fact patterns.103 The Reilly court goes on to critique two im-
portant differences between the data breach type case and cas-
es involving exposure to toxic substances and defective medical
101. See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (Thus, in the context of environmental
claims, a plaintiff may challenge governmental action that creates a credible
threat of harm before the potential harm, or even a statutory violation, has
occurred. Similarly, a plaintiff seeking to compel funding of a medical monitor-
ing program after exposure to toxic substances satisfies the injury-in-fact re-
quirement if he is unable to receive medical screening. In Pisciotta v. Old Na-
tional Bancorp, the Seventh Circuit extended that reasoning to the identity-
theft context, holding that plaintiffs whose data had been stolen but not yet
misused had suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article
III standing. (citations omitted)).
102. Compare EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
12 (1947) (The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is
reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process described by the doctrine
of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a
rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these:
similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case
is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case.
(footnotes omitted)), with RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE 86, 90 (1990) ([Reasoning by analogy] has . . . no definite content or
integrity; it denotes an unstable class of disparate reasoning methods . . . . I
merely question whether reasoning by analogy, when distinguished from logi-
cal deduction and scientific induction on the one hand and stare decisis on the
other, deserves the hoopla and reverence that members of the legal profession
have bestowed on it.).
103. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011) (pointing
out that both courts simply analogized data-security-breach situations to
defective-medical-device, toxic-substance-exposure, or environmental-injury
cases and describing both courts rationales as skimpy).
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devices.104 The court argues that toxic substance and defective
medical device cases involve human health concerns and in-
clude an injury that has undoubtedly occurred; both of which
are absent in the data breach cases.105 The court next distin-
guishes data breaches from environmental contamination cases
by arguing that in the latter branch of cases, monetary com-
pensation may not adequately return plaintiffs to their original
position, whereas in data breach cases, they would.106 Fur-
thermore, the Reilly court points out that the instrumentality
by which the future harm will occur differs between data
breach cases and these others.107 In data breach cases, the in-
strumentality is a human, whereas in the other cases the in-
strumentalities include toxins, medical equipment, and con-
taminants.108 It is an error to assume that these disparate
instrumentalities will work in a consistent manner. Although
this Note argues for a conclusion in line with that arrived at by
the courts in Krottner and Pisciotta, the flaws in the reasoning
104. Id. at 45.
105. Id. (These analogies do not persuade us, because defective-medical-
device and toxic-substance-exposure cases confer standing based on two im-
portant factors not present in data breach cases. First, in those cases, an inju-
ry has undoubtedly occurred. In medical-device cases, a defective device has
been implanted into the human body with a quantifiable risk of failure. Simi-
larly, exposure to a toxic substance causes injury; cells are damaged and a
disease mechanism has been introduced. Hence, the damage has been done;
we just cannot yet quantify how it will manifest itself. In data breach cases
where no misuse is alleged, however, there has been no injuryindeed, no
change in the status quo . . . . Any damages that may occur here are entirely
speculative and dependent on the skill and intent of the hacker. Second,
standing in medical-device and toxic-tort cases hinges on human health con-
cerns. Courts resist strictly applying the actual injury test when the future
harm involves human suffering or premature death . . . . This case implicates
none of these concerns. The hacker did not change or injure Appellants bodies;
any harm that may occurif all of Appellants stated fears are actually real-
izedmay be redressed in due time through money damages after the harm
occurs with no fear that litigants will be dead or disabled from the onset of the
injury. (citations omitted)).
106. Id. (As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained
in Central Delta Water Agency, standing is unique in the environmental con-
text because monetary compensation may not adequately return plaintiffs to
their original position. In a data breach case, however, there is no reason to
believe that monetary compensation will not return plaintiffs to their original
position completelyif the hacked information is actually read, copied, under-
stood, and misused to a plaintiffs detriment. (citation omitted)).
107. Id. (noting that any damages that may occur [in the case at hand] are
entirely speculative and dependent on the skill and intent of the hacker).
108. Id.
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utilized by both courts results in an inadequately supported
conclusion, and therefore support must be sought elsewhere.
2. Reilly Avoids the Analogy Pitfall but Reaches the Wrong
Conclusion
The Reilly court steers clear of analogy for the most part in
holding that the Appellants allegations of hypothetical, future
injury do not establish standing under Article III109though
the courts reasoning is not without its flaws. The Reilly courts
main concern with the allegations is that they are hypothetical
and rely on significant speculation.110 According to the Reilly
court, in order for the future injury being alleged to occur, the
hacker must have (1) read, copied, and understood their per-
sonal information; (2) intend[] to commit future criminal acts
by misusing the information; and (3) [be] able to use such in-
formation to the detriment of Appellants by making unauthor-
ized transactions in Appellants names.111 Certainly these
three conditions must be met for future harm to occur; howev-
er, these scenarios are not as speculative as the court would
have the reader believe.
The least speculative of the bunch is the assumption that
the hacker intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing
the information.112 As the Remijas court so aptly puts it,
[p]resumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to
make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers identi-
ties.113 The data stolen in a data breach is often misused for
personal gain by the hackers; however, there are instances
where obtaining and abusing data is not the ultimate goal of
the hack. For example, zero day exploits, occur when a group
hacks a companys security network in order to sell them in-
formation about where they are vulnerable and how to shore up
these vulnerable areas.114 However, if the true purpose of the
109. Id. at 41.
110. See id. at 42 (Appellants contentions rely on speculation that the
hacker [will take a number of actions] . . . . Unless and until these conjectures
come true, Appellants have not suffered any injury; there has been no misuse
of the information, and thus, no harm.).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015).
114. Compare Numaan Huq, Follow the Data: Dissecting Data Breaches
and Debunking Myths, TREND MICRO 2335 (2015),
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hack was one of these zero day exploits, it would seem likely
that company would want to bring this information to light, as
it would cut against the assertion that the breached data is at
risk of misuse.
Next is the question of whether the hacker read, copied,
and understood their personal information;115 the only infor-
mation that we have from the Reilly case is that all that is
known is that a firewall was penetrated,116 and that [i]t is not
known whether the hacker read, copied, or understood the da-
ta.117 It seems premature to dismiss the plaintiffs suit based
on this lack of particular knowledge when there has not been
discovery and Ceridian Corporation is in control of all of the
details about the breach; what is to stop Ceridian Corporation
and other subsequent companies from not releasing the details
of a data breach in the hopes of getting any subsequent claims
thrown out at the pleading stage?
The third assumption that the appellants are making is
that the hacker is able to use [the] information to the detri-
ment of Appellants by making unauthorized transactions in
Appellants names.118 If the hacker is sophisticated enough to
gain access to a companys secure data, it is not much of a
stretch to assume that he or she is sophisticated enough to be
able to utilize that data for personal gain. Barring any facts
tending to show a hackers lack of sophistication, it seems im-
proper not to infer from the fact that the hacker has successful-
ly executed a data breach that he or she has some level of req-




mpaign=app (depicting ads on Deep Web marketplaces selling various person-
al information, including bank accounts, phone accounts, credit cards, and
social security numbers), with From Reagans Cyber Plan to Apple Vs. FBI:




mpaign=app (discussing how data breaches/hacks are sometimes done for rea-
sons other than to use the data accessed for personal gain, including to con-
duct a zero day exploit, to send a political message, and to embarrass the
hacked party).
115. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42.
116. Id. at 44.
117. Id. at 40.
118. Id. at 42.
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Reilly court believes to be speculative and attenuated seems to
be reasonably likely.
Contrary to the Reilly ruling, the benefit of the doubt at
the pleading stage as to the level of sophistication of the hacker
or the extent of access by the hacker in the course of a data
breach should be given to the party with the least information,
as they are least likely to be able to establish specific facts
about the breach.119 Forcing a plaintiff to allege with particu-
larity facts about the data breach when the company holds all
of the information about the breach threatens to turn away
many deserving plaintiffs at the pleading stage.120 It would be
better, as a matter of policy, to give the benefit of any doubt to
the data breach victims, as the company would be best able to
bring to light particular facts to rebut these presumptions of
requisite sophistication and extent of access. The contrary posi-
tion would allow a situation at the pleading stage where [t]he
required evidence will remain safely in wrongdoers files, hid-
den from public view.121
2. Remijas Gets the Reasoning and the Conclusion Right
The Remijas court also steers clear of analogy, but seems
more willing to make some of the plausible inferences that the
Reilly court refused to make. The Remijas court infers from the
fact that there has been a data breach that the perpetrator in-
tends to and is able to utilize this information for personal
gain.122 This inference is a critical one, and the reluctance of
119. See generally WILLIAM FUNK ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING: BARRING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR TO DESERVING
CLAIMANTS 1 (2010), http://www.progressivereform.org
/articles/Twombly_1005.pdf (The practical effect of the heightened pleading
standard is that many deserving plaintiffs will be unable to have their claims
heard in court, since they will not have access to any crucial facts that the
defendant is able to keep out of public view. As such, the plausibility pleading
standard places a nearly impossible burden on many deserving plaintiffs,
making it significantly harder for them to get past the pleadings stage of civil
litigation. As one might expect, valid complaints will often be wrongly dis-
missed if plaintiffs are required to prove factual allegations before having an
opportunity to gather evidence. The required evidence will remain safely in
wrongdoers files, hidden from public view.).
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015) (At this stage in the litigation, it is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs
have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach.
Why else would hackers break into a stores database and steal consumers
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the Reilly court to infer the same is a main reason why the
courts came to different conclusions on whether or not future
harm is imminent.123 The Remijas court also cites a United
States Government Accountability Office report that tends to
support the proposition that harm from data breaches can
commonly occur up to a year or longer from the date of the
breach.124 Furthermore, the Remijas court is more willing to
consider prophylactic measures taken to prevent future harm
stemming from a data breach as an injury.125
There are several aspects of the Remijas case that likely
made it easier for the court to find standing as opposed to the
case the Reilly court was considering. For one, there was par-
ticularity and conviction in the knowledge of what information
had been hacked in Remijas126 that was apparently lacking in
Reilly;127 though, as I have argued above, this lack of particu-
larity should have been given less weight than it was given in
Reilly. Furthermore in Remijas, 9200 cards had already been
fraudulently charged, whereas there were no reported abuses
of the breached data in Reilly.128 This is a fact which the Remi-
jas court found highly probative of a risk of future harm, and
which the Reilly court lacked.129 Although there were differ-
private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later,
to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers identities.).
123. Compare id. (describing the risk of future harm as plausible), with
Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43 (describing the risk of future harm as nothing more
than speculation).
124. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 69394 (The plaintiffs are also careful to say
that only 9,200 cards have experienced fraudulent charges so far; the com-
plaint asserts that fraudulent charges and identity theft can occur long after a
data breach. It cites a Government Accountability Office Report that finds
that stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to
commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on
the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years. (citing
U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 76, at 29)).
125. See id. at 694 (In our case, Neiman Marcus does not contest the fact
that the initial breach took place. An affected customer, having been notified
by Neiman Marcus that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to sub-
scribe to a service that offers monthly credit monitoring.).
126. See id. at 693 ([I]n our case there is no need to speculate as to
whether [the Neiman Marcus customers] information has been stolen and
what information was taken. (alternation in original)).
127. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40, 44 ([A]ll that is known is that a firewall
was penetrated . . . . It is not known whether the hacker read, copied, or un-
derstood the data.).
128. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690; Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43.
129. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 69293.
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ences in fact, a main takeaway from comparing these two cases
is that the Remijas court was willing to infer that the hacker
performed the data breach with malicious intent,130 whereas
the Reilly court refused to make the same inference.131 This is a
crucial difference in reasoning which is likely to continue to
divide these courts if not decided outside of the federal circuit
courts.
B. SPOKEO, INC. COULD SETTLE THE ISSUE
As discussed earlier, it is possible that this issue could be-
come much less contentious depending on how the United
States Supreme Court rules in the Spokeo, Inc. case currently
in front of it.132 A ruling in line with the Ninth Circuit in
Spokeo, Inc. is likely to remove some of the Article III standing
roadblocks that data breach litigation plaintiffs currently face.
The question presented in Spokeo, Inc. is, Whether Congress
may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no
concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke
the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right
of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.133 A
broad ruling would all but eliminate the Article III standing
requirement as long as a plaintiff could establish that a com-
pany had violated a federal statute which included a private
right of action.134 Because a large number of federal statutes
provide statutory damages for their violations, many are leery
that a broad ruling could have a devastating effect on the busi-
130. See id. (At this stage in the litigation, it is plausible to infer that the
plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus
data breach. Why else would hackers break into a stores database and steal
consumers private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, soon-
er or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers identi-
ties.).
131. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44 (Here, there is no evidence that the intru-
sion was intentional or malicious.).
132. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 1892 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015) (No. 13-1339); see also discussion supra
notes 7986 and accompanying text.
133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Spokeo, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-
1339).
134. See generally Cohen & Kirklin, supra note 80 (Spokeo asserts that, if
the Ninth Circuits decision is not overturned, the Article III standing re-
quirements would devolve into an empty formality . . . .).
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ness world.135 It is also possible for the Court to effectively
overrule Remijas, depending on how they word their opinion.
C. IF THE ISSUE REMAINS UNSETTLED POST-SPOKEO, INC., THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI,
IF AN OPPORTUNITY ARISES, AND ADOPT A HOLDING IN LINE
WITH THAT OF THE REMIJAS COURT
Before the recent passing of United States Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia,136 the trend of the United States Su-
preme Court had been to side with corporations.137 With Jus-
tice Scalias passing, that trend could potentially change;
though of course the outcome for Spokeo, Inc. is far from cer-
tain.138 If Spokeo, Inc. nevertheless comes out against the
Ninth Circuit, then the issue of this Note, whether Article III
standing should be conferred in data breach litigation cases
when the plaintiff(s) allege only potential future harm or the
prophylactic measures taken to prevent this potential future
135. See, e.g., James E. Tysse et al., In Potentially Significant Case, Su-
preme Court to Test Limits Of Privacy and Data Breach Class Actions Seeking
Statutory Damages, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 12, 2015),
http://www.bna.com/potentially-significant-case-n17179927616/ (Beyond
FCRA and RESPA, statutory damages provisions are integral parts of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, the Lanham Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, the Stored Communications Act and the Cable Communications
Privacy Act, among others. Such provisions are also embedded in laws of gen-
eral applicabilityincluding the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Actmeaning virtually every major
American company is vulnerable. And because these laws often provide statu-
tory damages of $1,000 or more per violation, some defendants may face mas-
sive liability for technical violations of federal law that result in no real
harm.).
136. See Gary Martin & Guillermo Contreras, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia Found Dead at West Texas Ranch, MYSANANTONIO.COM (Feb.
16, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/us-
world/article/Senior-Associate-Justice-Antonin-Scalia-found-6828930.php.
137. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Busi-
ness Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013) (We
find that five of the ten Justices who, over the span of our study (the 1946
through 2011 Terms), have been the most favorable to business are currently
serving, with two of them ranking at the very top among the thirty-six Justic-
es in our study.).
138. Cf. id. at 1450 (ranking Justice Scalia as the ninth most business
friendly United States Supreme Court Justice in the period from 1946 to
2011).
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harm, will remain split in the circuit courts.139 If this is the
case, the best solution is for the United States Supreme Court
to address this issue directly at a later date.
1. This Issue is Proper for Certiorari
There are many factors which the United States Supreme
Court considers when it decides whether or not to grant certio-
rari; one of these factors is whether a circuit split exists on an
important issue.140 It is unlikely that the Reilly and Remijas
courts will vacate their opinions or otherwise rule in contra-
vention to their holdings in these cases; as such, the circuit
split is likely to remain. It is worth noting that the circuit split
predated Clapper,141 and that although Clapper affected dis-
trict court rulings significantly, it seems to have affected only
the style of reasoning in federal circuit cases rather than de-
termining the outcome.142 Furthermore, the vast amount of da-
ta breaches that have occurred in the last decade, and the en-
suing torrent of litigation that typically follows, speaks towards
the importance of this issue.143
Because each of the federal circuit court data breach cases
discussed in this Note are past the time allotted for filing a writ
139. See cases cited supra note 7.
140. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be grant-
ed only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor
fully measuring the Courts discretion, indicate the character of the reasons
the Court considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a deci-
sion in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on
the same important matter.).
141. The Third Circuit split from the Ninth and Seventh in 2011. Compare
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the increased future risk of identity theft was sufficient to establish Article III
standing), and Pisciotta v. Old Natl Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir.
2007) (same), with Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that allegations of possible future injury stemming from a data
breach were not sufficient to satisfy Article III standing because the threat-
ened injury was not certainly impending).
142. The Seventh Circuit kept same viewpoint in Remijas as it had before
Clapper. Compare Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692
(7th Cir. 2015), with Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634. But the Remijas court used a
more refined reasoning. See discussion supra notes 122131 and accompany-
ing text.
143. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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of certiorari, the Court will need to wait for a new case to be
able to grant certiorari.144
2. If an Opportunity Arises, the Court Should Adopt a Ruling in
Line with the Remijas Court
If certiorari is granted for a subsequent data breach case,
the Court should adopt a ruling in line with the reasoning of
the Remijas court. Unlike the Pisciotta and Krottner courts, the
Remijas court does not make use of misguided analogies to oth-
er future harm cases.145 Furthermore, the Remijas court cor-
rectly identifies that the fact that a data breach has occurred is
evidence of the hackers malicious intent to use the data for
personal gain and to the detriment of the individuals whose
data has been breached.146
In addition to the reasoning of the Remijas court, the
courts holding seems superior to Reillys from a policy stand-
point. In Reilly, the court found the plaintiffs lack of particular
knowledge about the extent of access by the hacker, and the
hackers level of sophistication, as probative of the lack of cer-
tainty that harm was imminent.147 It seems prudent that,
should any doubt exist as to particular facts about the breach
at the pleading stage, the benefit of this doubt should be given
to the party who is least able to establish specific facts about
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (2012) (Any other appeal or any writ of certio-
rari intended to bring any judgment or decree in a civil action, suit or proceed-
ing before the Supreme Court for review shall be taken or applied for within
ninety days after the entry of such judgment or decree. A justice of the Su-
preme Court, for good cause shown, may extend the time for applying for a
writ of certiorari for a period not exceeding sixty days.).
145. See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (The [Pisciotta] court surveyed case
law addressing toxic substance, medical monitoring, and environmental
claims in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. It concluded: As
many of our sister circuits have noted, the injury-in-fact requirement can be
satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only
by increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise
faced, absent the defendants actions. We concur in this view. Once the plain-
tiffs allegations establish at least this level of injury, the fact that the plain-
tiffs anticipate that some greater potential harm might follow the defendants
act does not affect the standing inquiry. (citations omitted)).
146. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (At this stage in the litigation, it is
plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm
from the Neiman Marcus data breach. Why else would hackers break into a
stores database and steal consumers private information? Presumably, the
purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume
those consumers identities.).
147. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
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the breach.148 The Reilly courts position to the contrary would
likely incentivize companies to be secretive about the extent
and sophistication of a breach in the hopes that they could turn
the suit away at the pleading stage.149 By making the reasona-
ble assumption, as the Remijas court did, that hackers are able
to decipher the data they encounter, intend to misuse that in-
formation for personal gain, and are likely sophisticated
enough to do so,150 the burden of rebutting these presumptions
is properly placed with the party which holds all of the infor-
mation which could potentially be provided for rebuttal.
3. Other Solutions are Unlikely to Address the Litigation Issue
State and federal statutes focus on notification makes
them a poor avenue for consumers seeking remedial action.151
The intent of these statutes is to incentivize companies to take
preventative measures against data breaches.152 While these
statutes serve to prevent future incidents of data breach, it is
unlikely to result in any redress for individuals who have al-
ready suffered identity or financial data theft, as many of these
statutes lack a private right of action.153
148. Cf. FUNK ET AL., supra note 119, at 6 ([Heightened pleading stand-
ards] rob[] plaintiffs of the benefit of the longstanding rule requiring judges to
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Judges have long given
plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt in this manner . . . . (footnote omitted)).
149. Cf. id. at 1 (The practical effect of the heightened pleading standard
is that many deserving plaintiffs will be unable to have their claims heard in
court, since they will not have access to any crucial facts that the defendant is
able to keep out of public view . . . . As one might expect, valid complaints will
often be wrongly dismissed if plaintiffs are required to prove factual allega-
tions before having an opportunity to gather evidence. The required evidence
will remain safely in wrongdoers files, hidden from public view.).
150. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
151. See generally STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, supra note 90 (noting few
statutes providing a private right of action); Security Breach Notification
Laws, supra note 87 (providing a list of notification-based statutes).
152. See Pam Greenberg, Right to Know, ST. LEGISLATURES MAG., Dec.
2008, at 26, 27 http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles
/2008/08sldec08_right.pdf (The law also creates a powerful incentive on the
part of government and business to improve data security. . . . Companies
have increased security practices in response to data breach laws, according to
Chris Hoofnagle, director of Information Privacy Programs at the Berkeley
Center for Law & Technology, who supervised a survey of chief security offic-
ers by the Samuelson Clinic.).
153. See id. at 28 ([T]he effectiveness of data breach laws on these [identi-
ty] thefts is limited . . . . [But] security breach laws may have other benefits,
such as reducing a victims average losses and improving security practices.);
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The FTC has the authority to regulate data security pur-
suant to a FTC Act prohibiting unfair practices.154 Though the
FTC has been active in bringing administrative enforcement
actions over data breach issues, it lacks the authority to issue
civil penalties.155 In order for the FTC to fine a company pursu-
ant to this Act, the company must be in violation of a settle-
ment order.156 The FTC has the ability to force a company to
reimburse its consumers after a data breach; however, the FTC
decides which actions it will pursue, meaning that many data
breach victims cases are not pursued by the FTC. This makes
FTC action a poor source of recovery for most plaintiffs who
have suffered damages from a data breach.
CONCLUSION
Data breaches have affected hundreds of millions of Amer-
icans,157 with several hundred occurring just last year.158 Liti-
gation usually follows a data breach like a tail follows a dog;
however, data breach plaintiffs have faced common road-
blocks.159 Article III requires a showing of an injury-in-fact that
is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.160 This
Note discussed the federal circuit court split on the issue of
whether plaintiffs can satisfy Article IIIs standing requirement
while alleging only future harm or harm based on prophylactic
measures taken to protect against future harm, notably Reilly
and Remijas. This Note further discussed the relevance of the
United States Supreme Court cases Clapper and Spokeo, Inc.,
the latter of which is currently pending.
This Note argued that the threat of future harm in data
breach cases, and the prophylactic measures taken to protect
against this future harm should satisfy the injury-in-fact re-
quirement of Article III standing. Furthermore, it argued that
if Spokeo, Inc. does not solve the issue, ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court should, if an opportunity arises, resolve
see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(10) (West Supp. 2016) (This section does
not establish a private right of action.).
154. See discussion supra notes 9193 and accompanying text.
155. See STEVENS, supra note 93.
156. Id.
157. The number of records breached in the Healthcare sector alone num-
bered over 112 million in 2015. Munro, supra note 3.
158. See Identity Theft, supra note 2.
159. See Post, supra note 4.
160. SeeMonsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).
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this circuit split and adopt a ruling similar to that of the Remi-
jas court. The Remijas ruling has superior reasoning, and
makes for better policy, which make it more appealing than its
counterparts: Reilly, Krottner, and Pisciotta. Remijas, unlike
Krottner and Pisciotta, does not depend on a thinly constructed
analogy to other future harm cases, an analogy that this Note
has argued does not stand up to scrutiny. Although Reilly also
steered clear of this unsubstantiated argument by analogy, this
Note has argued that the reasoning in Remijas is superior.
Most notably, the Remijas court made the crucial inference
that a hacker who conducts a data breach likely intends to use
the data they access for personal gain and to the disadvantage
of those whose data was breached. The Reilly court refused to
make the same inference, arguing that it was indeterminate as
to what the hackers motivation was in executing the breach, as
to what the extent of the breach was, and as to what the hacker
intended to do with the data they acquired. Furthermore, the
Remijas court, in opposition to the Reilly court, appears to give
the benefit of the doubt concerning the details of the data
breach to the plaintiffs; this seems proper at the pleading
stage, as there has been no discovery and one party is in con-
trol of all of the data. Finally, United States Supreme Court
action on this issue is desirable because other legal solutions
seem unlikely to address the issue for ongoing and future data
breach litigation. The state and federal statutes focus primarily
on notification and typically lack a private right of action, and
the FTC, though it has the authority to regulate, and has regu-
lated extensively in the data security realm, remains a poor
avenue for most data breach victims seeking compensation.
***
